IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Iran's nuclear program has become one of the most polarizing issues in one of the world's most polarized regions. The country's leadership says that its goal in developing a nuclear program is the ability to generate electricity without dipping into the oil supply it prefers to sell abroad. The Bush administration said the program was meant to give Iran nuclear weapons to use to intimidate its neighbors and threaten the existence of Israel and vowed to block it, but without success. President Obama has also declared his opposition to the program, but has indicated that he will approach talks on the subject with more flexibility.
Iran's first nuclear program began in the 1960s under the Shah. It made little progress, and was abandoned after the 1979 revolution, which brought to power the hard-line Islamic regime. In the mid-1990s, a new effort began, raising suspicions in Washington and elsewhere. Iran insisted that it was living up to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but in 2002, an exile group obtained documents revealing a clandestine program. Faced with the likelihood of international sanctions, the government of Mohammad Khatami agreed in 2003 to suspend work on uranium enrichment and allow a stepped-up level of inspections by the International Atomic Energy Association while continuing negotiations with Britain, France and Germany.
In August 2005, Mr. Khatami, a relative moderate, was succeeded as president by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hard-line conservative. Shortly thereafter, Iran announced that it was resuming work on turning uranium into a gaseous form, the first step in the so-called fuel cycle. The following January, Iran announced that it would resume enrichment work, leading the three European nations to break off their long-running talks. Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has the right to enrich uranium, but the atomic energy association called for the program to be halted until questions about the earlier, secret program were resolved.
In May 2006 the United States, unable to win agreement at the United Nations for sanctions, said it would join European negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program if Iran suspended uranium activities. After months of talks about talks, the United Nations voted in December 2006 to impose sanctions on Iran for failing to heed calls for a suspension. Mr. Ahmadinejad and the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, vowed defiance, and Iranian scientists continued the work of building a series of centrifuges that concentrate uranium by spinning the gas at very high speeds.
In Washington, administration hawks, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, were reported to favor consideration of more aggressive measures, including possible air strikes, while Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pushed for more diplomacy. In August 2007, Mohammad ElBaradei, the head of the international atomic agency, announced that he had struck a deal under which Iran agreed to resolve all outstanding questions quickly.
By the end of November, however, all parties appeared to be back to square one. Mr. ElBaradei reported that some, but not all, of the questions had been answered, and Iran's new nuclear negotiator announced that none of the years of previous discussions were relevant.
But then on Dec. 3, American intelligence agencies issued a new National Intelligence Estimate that concluded that the weapons portion of the Iranian nuclear program remained on hold. Contradicting the assessment made in 2005, the report stated that the Iranian government did not appear determined to obtain nuclear weapons, although it said Iran's intentions were unclear, and that the country probably could not produce a bomb until the middle of the next decade.
In 2008, President Bush deflected a secret request by Israel for specialized bunker-busting bombs it wanted for an attack on Iran's main nuclear complex and told the Israelis that he had authorized new covert action intended to sabotage Iran's suspected effort to develop nuclear weapons, according to senior American and foreign officials.
The White House denied Israel's request to fly over Iraq to reach Iran's major nuclear complex at Natanz, American officials said, and the Israelis backed off their plans, at least temporarily. But the tense exchanges also prompted the White House to step up intelligence-sharing with Israel and brief Israeli officials on new American efforts to subtly sabotage Iran's nuclear infrastructure.
In February 2009, in their first appraisal of Iran's nuclear program since President Obama took office, atomic inspectors found that Iran recently understated by a third how much uranium it has enriched, United Nations officials said. The officials also declared for the first time that the amount of uranium that Tehran had now amassed -- more than a ton -- was sufficient, with added purification, to make an atom bomb.
On April 8, 2009, the Obama administration said the United States would start participating regularly with other major powers in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, which is a further step toward the direct engagement. It followed an invitation to Iran to join in a new round of talks, which would include Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China. And it coincided with an unusual expression of conciliation toward the United States by President Admadinejad, who said in a speech on that day that his government would welcome talks with the Obama administration, provided that the shift in American policy was "honest."
The Bush administration largely shunned these European-led negotiations with Tehran; in July 2008, it reluctantly sent a senior diplomat to a single round of talks that ended in stalemate.
In April 2009, officials said that the Obama administration and its European allies are preparing proposals that would shift strategy toward Iran by dropping a longstanding American insistence that Tehran rapidly shut down nuclear facilities during the early phases of negotiations over its atomic program. Instead, the talks would focus on requests to allow greater access to international inspectors, and would seek to move toward an eventual halt of enrichment.
On May 20, Iran test fired an upgraded surface-to-surface missile with a range of about 1,200 miles, the Iranian government announced and Western officials confirmed.
The reported range of the Sejil-2 missile would put it within striking distance of Israel and of American bases in the Persian Gulf. The launch would appear to represent Iran's first successful test of a solid-fuel missile, which would be much more mobile and easier to hide than their current generation of liquid-fueled rockets. Until now, the country's longest-range missile has been the liquid-fueled Shahab-3, which is based on a design that it obtained from North Korea.
American officials and international inspectors are concerned that Iran seems to have made significant pro
gress in the three technonologies necessary to field an effective nuclear weapon: enriching uranium to weapons grade; developing a missile capable of reaching Israel and parts of Western Europe; and designing a warhead that will fit on the missile.
The greatest mystery surrounds the warhead program, which intelligence agencies said in late 2007 had been halted at the end of 2003. It is unclear whether Iran has restarted its weaponization program.
On 19 February 2009, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the
implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council
resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
(Iran) (GOV/2009/8). This report covers relevant developments since that date.
A. Current Enrichment Related Activities
2. Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has continued to feed UF6 into Unit A24, and twelve cascades of Unit A26, at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP).1 The six other cascades of Unit A26 have been installed and are under vacuum. Iran has also started installation of cascades at Unit A28; seven cascades have been installed and are under vacuum, and installation of another cascade is continuing. Installation work at Units A25 and A27 is also continuing.
3. Iran has estimated that, between 18 November 2008 and 31 May 2009, 5723 kg of UF6 was fed into the cascades and a total of 500 kg of low enriched UF6 was produced.3 The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades, remain under Agency containment and surveillance.4 Since the last physical inventory verification (PIV), the Agency and Iran have continued to discuss improvements in the facility’s accountancy system.
In addition, the Agency has informed Iran that, given the increasing number of cascades being installed at FEP and the increased rate of production of LEU at the facility, improvements to the containment and surveillance measures at FEP are required in order for the Agency to continue to fully meet its safeguards objectives.
The Agency has proposed a solution and initiated discussions with Iran to that end.
4. Between 15 January 2009 and 23 May 2009, a total of approximately 54 kg of UF6 was fed into the 10-machine IR-3 cascade, the 10-machine IR-2 cascade and single IR-1, IR-2, IR-2 modified, IR-3 and IR-4 centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). The nuclear material at PFEP, as well as the cascade area, remains under Agency containment and surveillance.
5. To date, the results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP indicate that the plants have been operating as declared (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment).5 Since March 2007,
26 unannounced inspections have been conducted at FEP. Twenty-five of these inspections were
successfully implemented. For one inspection, carried out on 19 May 2009, access to the facility was not granted by Iran within the agreed time because of an ongoing security drill being carried out at the facility by Iran which had been notified in advance to the Agency. The Agency has initiated discussions with Iran on arrangements in connection with unannounced inspections that would allow the Agency to meet its safeguards objectives within the required timeframe under similar circumstances.
B.___Reprocessing Activities
6. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX)
Facility. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities.
While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these two facilities, as the measures of the Additional Protocol are not available.
C. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects
7. The Agency last visited the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) in August 2008
(GOV/2008/59, para. 9). On 22 April 2009, the Agency again requested access to carry out design information verification (DIV) at the IR-40. In a letter dated 3 May 2009 referring to previous communications concerning the submission of design information, Iran informed the Agency that it would not permit the Agency to carry out the DIV.
8. Iran’s refusal to grant the Agency access to IR-40 could adversely impact the Agency’s ability to carry out effective safeguards at that facility, and has made it difficult for the Agency to report further on the construction of the reactor, as requested by the Security Council. The completion of the containment structure over the reactor building, and the roofing for the other buildings on the site, makes it impossible to assess further progress on construction inside the buildings without access to the facility. However, satellite imagery suggests that construction is continuing at the reactor site.
9. On 23 May 2009, the Agency conducted an inspection at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant, at which time it was noted that, with the exception of the final quality control testing area, the process line for the production of fuel assemblies for the heavy water reactor fuel had been completed, and that one fuel assembly had been assembled from previously produced fuel rods.
10. Using satellite imagery, the Agency has continued to monitor the status of the Heavy Water
Production Plant, which appears to have been operating intermittently since the last report.
D. Other Implementation Issues
D.1. Uranium Conversion
11. Between 8 and 12 March 2009, the Agency conducted a PIV at the Uranium Conversion Facility. During the PIV, Iran presented 345 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 for Agency verification. The Agency is evaluating the results of the PIV.
D.2. Design Information
12. As previously reported to the Board of Governors, the Agency has still not received preliminary design information, as requested by it in December 2007, for the nuclear power plant that is to be built in Darkhovin (GOV/2008/38, para. 11).
13. Iran has not yet implemented the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part (GOV/2008/59, para. 9; GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14). Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but is not implementing the provisions of the revised Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information. The absence of such information results in late notification to the Agency of the construction of new facilities and changes to the design of existing facilities.
D.3. Other Matters
14. On 1 November 2008, Iran transferred a few kilograms of low enriched UF6 from PFEP to the
Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre.6 In a letter dated 1 June 2009, Iran clarified that the material will be used in conversion experiments for the manufacturing of UO2 targets to be irradiated in the Tehran Research Reactor for the production of radioisotopes for medical applications.
15. Iran has informed the Agency that the loading of fuel into the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is now scheduled to take place in September/October 2009.
16. Using satellite imagery, the Agency has observed a continuation of ore recovery activities in the
area of the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant (UPP) and at the Saghand uranium mine. New
construction and modifications to buildings and process plant have also been observed at UPP, the
Saghand uranium mine and the Ardakan Yellow Cake Production Plant, although it is difficult to
assess the operational status and degree of utilization of these plants.
E. Possible Military Dimensions
17. As detailed in the Director General’s previous reports to the Board (most recently in
GOV/2009/8, para. 15), there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. As indicated in those reports, for the Agency to be able to address these concerns and make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, it is essential that Iran, inter alia, implement the Additional Protocol and provide the information and access requested by the Agency.
The Agency has still not received a positive replyfrom Iran in connection with the Agency’s requests for access to relevant information, documentation,locations or individuals.
18. In a letter to Iran dated 29 May 2009, the Agency responded to Iran’s letters dated
16 September 2008, 28 November 2008 and 2 March 2009, in which Iran had, inter alia, provided its views on a number of issues referred to in the Director General’s reports and questioned the correctness of certain statements contained in the reports attributed to Iran in connection with possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and statements in relation to the resolution of the issues contained in the Work Plan. In its letter, the Agency explained why the statements in the Director General’s reports were correct. The Agency also reiterated its request to meet with relevantIranian authorities at the earliest possible opportunity, with a view to addressing in a substantive and comprehensive manner the issues that remain outstanding
19. As has been reported in previous reports, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.
20. Iran has not, however, implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, on the early provision of design information, and has continued to refuse to permit the Agency to carry out design information verification at IR-40.
21. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related
projects as required by the Security Council.
22. Contrary to the request of the Board of Governors and the requirements of the Security Council, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues which give rise to concerns and which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.
Unless Iran implements the Additional Protocol and clarifies the outstanding issues, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
possession to permit Iran to respond substantively to the questions raised by the Agency. However, the Director General urges Member States which have provided documentation to the Agency to work out new modalities with the Agency so that it could share further information with Iran since the Agency’s inability to share additional information with Iran, and to provide copies or, if possible, originals, is making it difficult for the Agency to progress further in its verification.
24. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate
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